The Agent Orange Fiasco
By Michael Newton and Alvin Young
Everyone has heard of Agent Orange. How many know that it is basically identical to a commercial weed killer (2,4-D plus 2,4,5-T) that was used for decades in this country to clear brambles, poison ivy, and brush, improve visibility along roads, keep trees from growing into power lines, and promote healthy public forests and rangeland? Thousands of Americans applied this herbicide, and virtually every state and locality used it widely.
The environment in Vietnam posed many challenges to Allied Forces in waging a war against an elusive enemy, concealed in large part by heavy rainforest. Climatic conditions not only promoted rapid vegetative growth but also generated a multitude of diseases, including malaria. Thus, Allied Forces employed an arsenal of pesticides intended to control vegetation as well as the mosquitoes that carried the threat of disease. Amidst hard losses, and anti-war resistance, our country was desperate to make Vietnam safer for our troops.
Herbicides that had been used in America for years were employed to open the jungle canopies. Tree cover along shipping channels was removed to prevent enemy attacks. The product used for these lifesaving tasks was “Herbicide Orange,” so known because it was shipped in barrels color coded with an orange band. Only after the war did the media give the product the more sinister name “Agent Orange”—as if it were a poison gas.
The Evidence
In 1970, a study in Science reported that when rats were fed very high doses of 2,4,5-T early in pregnancy, birth defects resulted. It turned out that the particular sample of 2,4,5-T used by the investigators was heavily contaminated with a chlorinated dioxin known as TCDD, a highly poisonous material present in tiny concentrations in many disinfectants and other commercial products, in incinerator exhaust, and even in broiled hamburgers.
But anti-war activists quickly latched onto the study to accuse America of using chemical warfare. They claimed there would be disastrous effects on our troops, the Vietnamese, and their offspring. Since passage of the Agent Orange Act of 1991, the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) has provided health care and presumptive compensation to thousands of veterans whose illnesses could supposedly have been caused by exposure to the herbicide. Today, as Vietnam veterans are moving into their 60s, they are being encouraged by hundreds of law firms to sue for compensation for alleged chemical injuries, despite the care and compensation provided them by the DVA.
But can the chemicals in question really have produced the long-term harm claimed? In scientific fact, 2,4,5-T is considerably less toxic than caffeine. And though most Agent Orange also had traces of dioxin in it, there is a rich scientific literature making clear that a relatively heavy dose of dioxin, inside the body, is required to produce symptoms. Dioxin is very toxic in pure form, but its occurrence in 2,4,5-T is small enough to be described as trivial, compared to the toxicity of many other substances and environmental hazards experienced by our veterans in Vietnam.
An even more fundamental question is, “Were Vietnam veterans actually exposed to these compounds at all?” Recent historical records and scientific publications do not support the anecdotal stories of widespread exposure. A close examination of the contemporary military records revealed that detailed policies and procedures for the approval and execution of spray missions ensured that friendly forces were not located in the areas targeted for spraying of herbicides. Anecdotal reports of direct spraying of troops in Vietnam likely reflected seeing aircraft spraying insecticides, not Agent Orange.
But what if everything possible went wrong? The worst-case scenario would have been soldiers sitting outdoors in a forest being sprayed with 2,4,5-T, shirtless and hatless, eating uncovered food. In this case, the most 2,4,5-T that could have landed on a G.I. would have been about a quarter of a gram of 2,4,5-T, usually containing less than a millionth of a gram of dioxin, on the outside of his body. Studies conducted by your authors in Vietnam, the Philippines, and at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, where the aerial spraying equipment was developed and tested, showed that 2,4,5-T disappeared very rapidly. Dioxin is also destroyed by the ultraviolet light in sunshine in a matter of hours.
Long-term studies of wildlife at Eglin Air Force Base, where Agent Orange was applied at 100 times the rate used in Vietnam, confirmed that even though some animal species like beach mice accumulated a measurable amount of dioxin from continuously burrowing into contaminated soil, no reproductive problems or other symptoms of toxic effects were observed in these animals. Meanwhile, the total exposure to troops from a one-time application of Agent Orange would have been far less severe than the exposure encountered by thousands of 2,4,5-T applicators at home, who in numerous studies have shown no unique or even common health problems.
But, as noted, very few Americans were ever present when and where Agent Orange was sprayed. Friendly troops were cleared from areas to be sprayed so that the fighter aircraft accompanying spray planes could suppress hostile fire without risk of injury to friendly troops. By the time friendly forces returned, spray deposits that had dried in minutes were as immobile as a grease spot on a white shirt. They could not be brushed off. And residues, such as they were, disappeared in days through chemical breakdown.
Even if troops had been in the area, less than a tenth of the spray released would have filtered through the dense forest cover to reach people on the ground. Many have claimed to have been drenched with spray; that simply could not have happened with defoliants. These materials were sprayed at the rate of only three gallons spread aerially on an acre, which is 43,560 square feet. None would have penetrated fatigues. And in the space of a one-year tour of duty, the chance of any person encountering repeated contact with the material was virtually zero if he was not part of a spray crew. Because these chemicals do not readily dissolve in water, drinking water was also unlikely to produce any exposure in detectible amounts.
The Panic
Those of us actually studying the effects of defoliants in Vietnam on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences could scarcely recognize the reports we began seeing when stories of Agent Orange hit American newspapers and TV. Not surprisingly, the media panic caused many veterans to assume they might have been harmed. Political uproar was so loud that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency soon suspended uses of 2,4,5-T in forests and rights-of-way. The EPA’s suspension was triggered by an investigation of scattered human miscarriages in forested areas of Oregon in which there was no evidence whatever of contact with herbicides by pregnant women. That action was criticized in many countries as politically motivated. And the EPA continued to allow the use of 2,4,5-T for weed control in rice fields and on rangelands for cattle—uses in our potential food chain.
What is the evidence on humans most exposed to the chemical? About 1,200 American servicemen in Vietnam directly handled Agent Orange in support of Operation Ranch Hand, the tactical spray program, and another 1,000 in the Army Chemical Corps had responsibility for spraying the perimeter of bases. These were the only persons known to have had measurable exposure, and their exposure was often heavy. Every one of these people has had many physical exams since leaving Vietnam, and each now has an elaborately documented health history. Scientists have written numerous articles about their health patterns, and in almost every analysis, their health has been comparable to that of servicemen who never served in Vietnam. Among the Ranch Hand and Chemical Corps personnel there is a small excess of diabetes, heretofore not known to be related to any of the chemicals involved, and for which there is no medical explanation. Other than that, their health is normal.
In 1986, the Centers for Disease Control reported that dioxin concentrations in over 600 veterans judged likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam were the same as those in veterans who never served in Vietnam. Moreover, the amount of dioxin in their bodies was similar to that of the population at large. Similar results were found in Korean Vietnam veterans, who actually had less dioxin in their bodies than Koreans who stayed home. In 2004, the CDC conducted a mortality study of 18,313 Vietnam veterans likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange. The study concluded that, 30 years after their service, death rates from disease-related chronic conditions like cancer and circulatory disorders did not differ between Vietnam veterans and their peers.
Lessons To Be Learned
Many lessons can be learned from the history of the Agent Orange panic. One is that when a government offers presumptive compensation for diseases (as by the Agent Orange Act of 1991), many persons will show up to collect. Some will not even have any disease. Others will have a disease, but caused by some different problem which will unfortunately go unnoted and untreated. Blaming something that could not have caused the problem is thus counterproductive.
A second lesson is that agencies regulating chemicals, foods, and many other aspects of our lives should be held accountable for sending out false signals. We recognize that those agencies are under immense pressure to respond to the public and to political concerns. Casting false blame, however, can have enormous negative consequences.
A third lesson is that our instant media has a powerful effect on our health. A charismatic anchorman can use a ten-second sound bite and images of someone in distress to create fear and panic.
A fourth lesson is that political furors can mask truth and produce false judgments. The scientific reality is that the Agent Orange defoliation missions saved thousands of lives in Vietnam. We must keep tangible benefits like that in view whenever shadowy claims of alleged harm are lined up on the opposite side of the ledger.
Sadly, the main effect of the hysteria over Agent Orange has been to further stress honorable and blameless persons who served their country in our military during an unpopular war. Such psychological stresses can indeed have severe and unnecessary long-term health consequences. That’s why we should be sure not to repeat the dismal Agent Orange story in future health panics.
Michael Newton is professor emeritus, Department of Forest Science, Oregon State University. Alvin Young was responsible for environmental analysis at Eglin Air Force Base while in the service, and is now a professor at the University of Oklahoma. Both have extensive experience studying and using the Agent Orange herbicides.
