How Wide is the Atlantic?
Today’s Euro-USA Split Will Persist
Victor Davis Hanson
The new chasm between Europe and the United States seems to widen still—even as transatlantic diplomats assure us that it has narrowed—despite a common heritage and a supposedly shared goal of global democracy, free markets, and defeating terrorists.
Europeans sell arms to autocratic China that will threaten democratic Taiwan. They legitimize the terrorists of Hamas and Hezbollah, and mostly caricature the American efforts at democratizing the Middle East. All this follows the past appeasement of Yasser Arafat, strife over the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, and the use of the United Nations to hamstring the United States in the war that followed 9/11.
What is behind this divide? Is it that the U.S. is militarily strong while the wealthy Europeans have made themselves essentially impotent—classic ingredients for deep seated envy?
Or did the close of the Cold War bring an end to the shared purposes that used to paper over the cracks of innate cultural differences? Americans tend to wish for less government and more personal freedom. They are more religious, aggressive, and acquisitive. Europeans instead prefer statism and an enforced equality of result. Far more of them are irreligious, pacifist, and more interested in leisure than in national progress and personal wealth. Now that they have no fear of the Soviet army, they have little need for us—or so they think.
Proponents of the old transatlantic alliance shrug and say things will improve. Some allege that George Bush’s cowboyism is to blame for the current rift. With a bit more astute diplomacy and softer voices—or someone like a French-speaking John Kerry
as President—we could get along as well as in the past.
Really? Euro-U.S. relations may have returned to civility and even shared commitment after the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, but our real closeness is probably over. NATO is comatose— a Potemkin alliance without a mission. It has devolved into Americans trying to shame affluent Europeans into buying a few more planes to add to their dreadfully feeble fighting forces—which lack any reflection of the vast wealth and population of Europe.
The shaky European Union is as much driven by anti-Americanism as by pro-Europeanism. Only with unity comes the hope to rebuff the United States effectively. In response, it is far more likely that Americans will envision Germany and France less as friends than as rivals. Since our own European ancestors tamed the frontier in order to craft a nation that would in many ways be an antithesis to their home continent, this is not a big stretch.
Careful reading of American history does not suggest a natural U.S. partnership with Europe. Rather, our past shows frequent antipathy, punctuated several times by violent hostilities: most recently in 1898, 1914, and 1941. Apart from the special British American companionship, solidarity between the U.S. and continental Europe was more likely a Cold War exception, not the rule. For 50 years the United States stayed engaged with Europe specifically to ensure that intercontinental squabbles would never again devour American blood. The Soviet Union served as a sort of ancient Persia—an enemy colossus that kept feuding Greek city-states friendly for a while, until the common threat faded and their innate suspicion returned.
The United States is rapidly becoming a universal nation. Continuing immigration, our democratic society, our ethnic and racial assimilation, our common popular culture, our meritocracy, and shared material dreams have created equal and unified Americans out of nearly all the tribes and races of the globe. Europe, for all its socialist pretenses, is a much more stratified and narrow society, plagued with unassimilated minorities. It is hard to imagine a Colin Powell, Alberto Gonzales, or Condoleezza Rice running the key ministries of France, Italy, or Belgium.
For four out of ten Americans today, their physical and spiritual origins have nothing to do with Europe—they are offspring of Asia, Latin America, or Africa. Demographic and immigration realities mean that our ostensible blood link with Europe will continue to thin. Like it or not, more Americans are coming to know and care less about Europe and more about China, Korea, Mexico, India, and the Philippines. The teaching of French, German, and Italian is sliding, while Spanish and Chinese rise.
Red-state/Blue-state tension in America reflects a similar divergence between America and Europe. As the United States becomes more conservative, it increasingly sees Europe as a fringe San Francisco or Massachusetts, not a mainstream Grand Rapids or Ohio. Europe’s rhetorical intrusions into our recent Presidential election confirmed that Europeans often embrace agendas that bother Americans—pacifism, radical secularism, utopian environmentalism, blind support for the U.N., socialized health care, government steering of the economy, redefinition of marriage, strident abortion rights, and open euthanasia.
We are fooled somewhat by Europe’s trade surpluses, the strong euro, and rich entitlements. But under that surface lurk high unemployment, weak growth, and demographic crises that threaten to unhinge the Continental socialist utopia. As recent E.U. plebescites suggest, the future will bring great strains as Europe’s already heavily taxed northwest transfers huge amounts of capital to subsidize the integration of more religious, nationalistic Europeans far closer to potential harm on the Islamic and Asian frontier. Will a Belgian or Dane really feel national kinship with a distant Bulgarian, Ukrainian, or Turk in the years ahead?
The differences between American and European material wealth are now marked and growing—Americans increasingly enjoy larger homes, more cars, more appliances, cheaper food and energy, more advanced health care, and more disposable income. A recent European visitor to my farm, a member of the professional and affluent class, was stunned when I showed him the new suburban houses and multiple cars of first generation immigrants from Mexico living nearby—in the poorest section of one of the poorest inland counties of rural California. “They seem wealthier than I am!” he exclaimed. In a global sense they really are, even without the subsidized train tickets, day care payments, and a government-guaranteed six-week vacation.
Some transatlanticists will grant these endemic problems, but assure us that Europe’s problems will be self correcting, that more conservative reformers will eventually retake power and mimic the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions to prune back government largesse and encourage renewed self-reliance—noting in addition that we have the same enemy in Islamic fascism. Nothing in Europe’s history, however, suggests that a moderate response to the current maladies is likely.
Popular frustration over Islamic terrorism and unassimilated minorities may grow, and Europeans could become tired of appeasing extremist mullahs and terrorists and begin looking for principled opposition based on real military power. A few politicians may warn of the dangers of a future Europe with only one worker for one pensioner, of a self absorbed society where children, religious fraternity, and hard work are seen as retrograde, or caricatured as American.
But it is just as likely that any European counter-reaction will be unproductive. Instead of calling for more American-style assimilation and intermarriage, critics could prescribe strict isolation of Islamic minorities. Re-arming could make Europe even more hostile, rather than promoting Western unity. The longer work hours, reduced welfare subsidies, increased transparency, and economic flexibility needed by Europe might be received by the masses not as necessary medicine, but as foul concoctions forced down their throats by the hated American competition.
What can the United States do to mitigate the forthcoming estrangement? Several things:
• Withdraw as many American troops from the Continent as is not injurious to the global responsibilities of the United States. That will remind the Europeans that anti- American rhetoric has consequences, and that the pathology of the present teenager-parent relationship must end for both our sakes.
• Allow dissident Europeans to enjoy fast-track immigration to the United States. Welcoming folks from Europe who wish to join the American experience will send a powerful reminder to European elites that there were reasons their own people left their shores in the first place. Special warm immigration considerations for Europeans should replace the military alliances that used to knit us together.
• Quietly cultivate friendships with eastern European countries, and encourage stronger relations with countries that have signaled shared interests with the U.S., like Britain, Denmark, Holland, and Italy, all of which have reason to be wary of the French- German axis. At the same time, rely more on our cordial ties with Japan, Taiwan, India, and Australia—whose democratic societies, confident populations, and legitimate fears of a China armed by Europe equal our own.
• We must keep Europe in mind in all questions of U.N. reform. The European Union deserves one collective U.N. veto befitting its new transcontinental nationhood, not multiple votes as at present. India and Japan should assume their rightful places at the Security Council table next to the single European vote. And we should press for a General Assembly composed only of elected governments, rather than the present mix of democracies and rogue regimes that often look to Europe for tolerance, subsidies, and trendy anti-Americanism.
• Finally, we must seek out pragmatic Europeans who are tired of business as usual, and wish to reform their union in ways that will promote American affinity. They are out there, but overwhelmed at home, and ignored by American liberals in our universities, corporations, the State Department, and elsewhere. Through government programs, think tanks, military links, shared business interests, and grass-root exchanges we must make direct connections with the many millions of Europeans who share American ideals, but have no way of expressing them on a continent dominated by a small class of haughty elites.
TAE contributing writer Victor Davis Hanson is a scholar of military history.
Europe Is Starting to Sing the Bush Tune
Danielle Pletka
Over the past four years, an inordinate amount of ink has been spilled over the chasm between the United States and Europe. A reappraisal of the conventional wisdom is in order. Rhetoric aside, there has been an extraordinary convergence of policies across the Atlantic during the last year. More surprising still, that convergence has been achieved by a shift in Europe toward Washington’s point of view.
Increasingly, Washington is setting not only the agenda but also the terms of debate. From Israel-Palestine to Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, and Ukraine, American and European officials have been hitting the same notes. Washington has been concerned about Iran’s nuclear program for years, while Europe appeared uninterested. Now a panicky Europe is taking the lead in trying to prevent that program from moving forward. Similarly, President Bush argued for years that Yasser Arafat and his culture of terror and corruption were the chief obstacle to Israeli Palestinian negotiations, while Europe was unwilling to toss Arafat aside. Now European leaders agree that democracy, security, and accountability within the Palestinian leadership are prerequisites for peace.
The logic of Turkish accession to the European Union, and the belief that Turkey could sink into the Middle East morass unless enmeshed in the European web, is now becoming conventional wisdom in Brussels. Similarly, most Europeans accept, at last, that Islamist extremism is among the gravest of threats.
Maybe the most unexpected team effort was the French- American campaign to get Syria out of Lebanon. For years, the U.S. had toiled alone in its efforts to isolate Damascus and dislodge Syrian troops from its southern neighbor. After the assassination of ex-prime minister Rafik Hariri, Paris suddenly joined as a partner, and now the last Syrian soldier has left Lebanon.
Much of the hand-wringing over the Atlantic rift of recent years implied that relations were peachy throughout the Cold War. In truth, there were regular and deep divisions then as well; we often agreed on little other than the Soviet threat to Europe. The fact that Europe and America can agree as often as they do is quite surprising, absent the unifying power of the Evil Empire.
One reason for the new Euro-American concert: gradual recognition that Islamist terror represents a new common enemy. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration was quicker to latch on to the realities of the post-Cold War world and the long-term threats that face all liberal democracies. In the wake of bombings in Madrid and London, Europe’s leaders are now also coming to terms with those realities.
Obviously not all is harmonious and beautiful. Washington remains protective of its sovereignty while Europe loves the global government models of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. There is considerable disagreement over arms sales to Cuba and China. And while Europe and the U.S. may agree about shared threats, there remain profound differences on the best policies to address them.
For the moment, the U.S. and Europe have settled into an international good cop/bad cop approach. The next problems will arise when the time comes for the good cop (Europe) to take action. After all, even a good cop must still be a cop.
British foreign secretary Jack Straw and his European partners have told us that negotiating with Iran is the only option. But talking may not stop an Iranian nuclear weapon. In August, Iran abandoned Europe’s carefully crafted agreement to suspend uranium enrichment. So what follows? Likewise, leaning on the Palestinians to fight terror may succeed; but if it does not, will Javier Solana, the E.U.’s foreign policy chief, walk away from the table? Mr. Bush will.
Nonetheless, even where there is serious backstage bickering, there are also now serious efforts to limit damage. Washington’s jibes against Europe have been replaced by diplomatic niceties. European cowboy quips and Hitler similes are in remission. Deepening today’s nascent U.S.-European cooperation will not be easy. But those who think the transatlantic relationship is dead are writing it off prematurely. They may not acknowledge it, but today more than ever, Europe is singing President Bush’s tune.
Danielle Pletka is vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at
AEI. A longer version of this piece appeared in the Financial Times.
Yes, the U.S. and Europe Are Drawing Closer
James Glassman
There is nothing Europeans want to hear from George Bush, nothing that will change their minds,” wrote Thomas Friedman of the New York Times earlier this year. “Mr. Bush is more widely and deeply despised than any U.S. President in history.” I couldn’t disagree more.
Sure, many Europeans still caricature and despise President Bush (just as many Blue Staters do). But European policymakers have been excruciatingly interested in what he had to say during his several 2005 trips to Europe.
The truth is that the United States and Europe are drawing closer. Not because Americans are acceding to the wishes of Europeans. Our policies haven’t changed; Europe has.
Why the difference, in such a short time?
First, Europeans have finally come to understand that, with his re-election, Bush is here to stay. He’s not changing his mind about Iraq, the Kyoto Protocol, or the International Criminal Court.
Second, the elections in Iraq had a profound effect. Le Monde, the left-leaning newspaper of France’s intelligentsia, ran the recent headline: “Franco-American Rapprochement After Iraq Elections.” My dictionary says a rapprochement is “an agreement between two opposing groups.” No, the French and Germans aren’t going to be sending troops to Iraq, but they are becoming involved in security and reconstruction. The election gives them a rationale: It’s the Iraqis who seek their assistance, not the Americans.
Third, the President has formulated his foreign policy with more clarity, offering a convincing argument, combining principle and prudence, that spreading democracy in the Middle East will make the world safer. Fourth, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is seen, unlike her predecessor, as speaking for the President. And she and the President have focused much attention on questions related to Europe (in the first term it was Mexico).
Fifth, the E.U. itself is different, with the accession last year of ten new countries, mainly from Eastern Europe. European parliament members from such countries recognize the U.S. role in freeing them from Soviet domination. Moreover, Tony Blair has been re-elected; Gerhard Schroeder’s position was so wobbly he called for special country-wide elections a year early; Jacques Chirac has been repudiated by French voters. The European Commission’s new president is Jose Manuel Barroso, former conservative prime minister of Portugal. He is pushing for U.S.-style liberalization of European economies with allies like Ireland’s Charlie McCreevy and Neelie Kroes of the Netherlands. Europe’s leaders are beginning to recognize that their economies are stagnant and losing out.
Europe’s Left Bank intellectuals will still ridicule Bush. Increasingly, though, they are becoming as irrelevant as their counterparts in Manhattan and Hollywood.
TAE contributing writer James Glassman is a resident fellow at AEI.
Is This Relationship Doomed?
Thomas Donnelly
Since the launch of the global war on terror, relations between the United States and Western Europe have soured. The problem is not a limited disagreement over Operation Iraqi Freedom, but a fundamental divergence in American and European interests which has long been developing.
Take the sharp differences in ideas about what international politics is supposed to be about. Our President began the year 2005 with speeches, like his inaugural address and State of the Union, where it seemed as if every third word was “freedom.” That’s quite a contrast to European leaders, who tend to choose terms that won’t rock the international boat. The United States has adopted a “forward strategy of freedom,” while Europe shies from projecting liberal ideals abroad. The U.S. remains a revolutionary power, not one of the status quo, and all the talk of shared values masks this important difference between the U.S. and Europe.
For instance: Americans have very different goals in the Middle East than do Europeans. Forget Iraq; just look at Afghanistan. On paper it is the poster child for transatlantic cooperation, but the on-the-ground reality is that the U.S. and its NATO allies occupy separate universes in Afghanistan. If you talk to leaders of the Afghan government and leaders of the American mission, the questions are how long NATO will last in Afghanistan, and what value can be wrung from its extremely limited commitment.
The issue most likely to rip apart what’s left of the transatlantic relationship is the military modernization of China. There is an arms race underway in East Asia. Any senior Japanese or Australian diplomat speaking confidentially expresses anxiety about China’s rapid military buildup. China has bought fleets of former Soviet airplanes, naval destroyers, submarines, rockets, and missiles. It has developed its own missiles over the past decade to the point where a decapitation strike on Taiwan is a legitimate concern throughout the region.
The one thing the Chinese military lacks is the command-and- control electronic whiz-bangs that make Western armies so effective. To make that kind of technology available to the People’s Liberation Army will toss explosives on a smoldering fire in East Asia, possibly setting off a war over the Taiwan Straits and igniting conflict throughout the entire region. Thanks to the Europeans, American forces could be fighting weapons systems supplied by NATO allies, a serious concern that will jeopardize any improvement in American-European relations.
European nations that want to transfer military technologies to China should bear the burden of proof to reassure us that these weapons won’t be aimed at us in a war over Taiwan or as we maintain liberty and stability in East Asia. China is under threat from absolutely nobody, so there’s no need to arm China any faster than it can arm itself.
The strategic focus of the United States has shifted far beyond Europe. Forward-looking strategists in the administration are more interested in cultivating partnerships with India than reviving links with France or Germany, and properly so. India’s strategic interests are more likely to coincide with ours. It’s more willing to use military force as a tool of statecraft than some European nations are. And India cares about the rise of China and radical Islam.
Yes, India refused to send troops to Iraq without a U.N. flag. But at least India has something to offer the U.S. militarily. If Germany had changed its mind about Iraq, what could it have brought to the table? Not much. If India had a change of heart about Iraq, it could offer serious military power.
The administration’s shift of focus away from Europe may help account for the somewhat improved U.S.-Euro relations of the last year. It’s easier to smooth things over with the Europeans when less is going on with them that’s of genuine strategic import.
But the somewhat better relations will crumble fast if Europe breaks the Chinese arms embargo. Differences of strategy over China are a cliff that we are near to tumbling over, creating tensions far beyond those of recent years. The current improved relations are like the last party on the Titanic before it hit the iceberg.
